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THE BRAKKE PROBLEM-ALLOCATION OF
SCARCE RESOURCES IN EDUCATION
AND OTHER AREAS*
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD**
I.
Whenever many apply and few are chosen individual pain is inescapable,
but the way is open for processes that do not automatically pit one race or
class against another.'
The Supreme Court has spoken, as so often these days, with many
voices. It is fortunate that it is so, for the pervasive problems it raises in
the field of education can perhaps be most accurately described as phil-
osophical or social problems, not necessarily resolvable by anything in
the Constitution or by the decisions of the Court.
Much has been written about the Bakke case,' both before and since
the Court's pronouncement. I do not propose to review these writings,
or even to examine the opinions of the Court in any detail. It is
enough, and fortunate, I think, that we are able to continue the essen-
tially social process of experimentation in this area, knowing that race
may be taken into account in academic admissions, but that quotas
based on a two-track system are invalid. We should not forget, though,
that Justice Powell, who is the only member of the Court who clearly
agrees with all aspects of this conclusion, recognized that "an admis-
sions program which considers race only as one factor" may be only "a
subtle and more sophisticated-but no less effective-means of accord-
ing racial preference."3 The difference is largely one of emphasis and
approach, which also reflects the fact that we are dealing with what is
essentially a social problem. But quotas are inherently invidious, even
* A lecture delivered at Washington University on November 29, 1978, as the third in a
erles on the Quest for Equality.
** Langdell Professor of Law Emeritus, and former Dean of Harvard Law School. A.B.,
A.M., 1925, Oberlin College; LL.B., 1928, S.J.D., 1929, Harvard University.
1. Bundy, Beyond Bakke-What Futurefor Affirmative Acion, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 69, 73
iNov. 1978).
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Id. at 318.
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when their purpose is benign. Consideration of race as one factor is not
much different, and we must not forget that when we follow the Bakke
problem in the years ahead. But it may be different enough, simply as
a matter of approach, so that we can properly proceed along that line,
and we do know that a rather complexly constructed majority of five
members of the Supreme Court has said that we can travel down that
road. Yet it remains a narrow road, with precipices on each side, and
experimentation must be thoughtfully constructed and carefully carried
out, with its results more thoroughly evaluated than has perhaps been
the case in the past.
In some aspects of our society when dealing with the allocation of
scarce resources, we rely on the market place, which acts in economic
terms on the basis of the law of supply and demand. Gold is a scarce
commodity, and it is allocated at the price that those who want it and
have the means are willing to pay. I have not yet heard of any "affirm-
ative action" program with respect to gold. We could, I suppose, use
the same method for allocating places in institutions of higher educa-
tion. I have not heard of any one who thinks that that would be a wise
or effective course to follow. The tradition of financial aid for students
in schools of higher education is of long standing. Although we have
not achieved full equality of opportunity as far as financial need is con-
cerned, we have gone far down the road that enables any person who
has adequate intellectual qualifications'to obtain an advanced educa-
tion regardless of his financial need.
II.
What then is the difference between gold or other items that we allo-
cate through the market place and education or other benefits for
which some other form of allocation is thought to be relevant and has
traditionally been used? I suppose that the underlying distinction,
often not clearly articulated, is that with respect to education and some
other areas, we are dealing with what is essentially a social problem in
which human factors are rightly relevant. This is surely part of the clue
to the difference between quotas and affirmative action.
Speaking in human or social terms, there are several factors that
merit consideration. With respect to professional schools, including
law and medical, a strong case can be made for the "mix." The pres-
ence of blacks and other minorities in a class of students can be sup-
posed to be advantageous in at least two ways. First, it can be thought
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to be a part of the educational process to have variety and diversity in
the student body. In this way members of the class can meet, and be
acquainted with, and sometimes be friends with, members of different
backgrounds. In sharing approaches and reactions they can contribute
to the common educational process, so that all members of the class can
go into the outside world with a broader background and increased
understanding. And second, the presence of increased numbers of stu-
dents from minority groups will help the educational institution to
meet its perceived obligation to train and introduce into society an in-
creased number of professional practitioners who will be available to
serve members of their own communities. For the time being, at least,
in the light of past discrimination, it is felt that many black clients or
patients may be better served, or may think they will be better served,
by black lawyers or doctors-though at the same time we look askance
at the suggestion that white clients or patients can properly prefer to
have white lawyers or doctors. That, indeed, is discrimination, or ra-
cism. We are truly in the midst of the modem stage of the American
dilemma-which, despite its difficulties, real and theoretical, is surely
an improvement over the situation about which Gunnar Myrdal wrote
some forty years ago.4
Another factor in favor of taking race into account in the matter of
admission to professional schools is the fact that unless we do for the
time being, at least, very few members of certain minority groups will
be admitted into the professions, and thus be made available to meet
the needs that are felt on behalf of the minority communities.5 This
problem was strikingly stated in two of the many briefs that were filed
with the Supreme Court in the Bakke case. One of these was filed by
the deans of the four state-supported law schools in California.6 The
other was filed on behalf of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS), and was written by an excellent committee of faculty members
in member schools. 7
4. G. MYDRAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
5. This is relevant in many ways. There is the waste of talent that results if qualified persons
Lannot find opportunities. Law and medicine are inevitably involved in politics in the broad
,enw, and minority groups will be underrepresented in the political process if their members can-
not gain admission to the professions. And there are many other social benefits that are depen-
dent on "access to the system."
6. Dean Sanford H. Kadish of Berkeley, Dean Pierre R. Loiseaux of Davis, Dean William
D Warren of Los Angeles, and Dean Martin J. Anderson of Hastings.
7. Provost A. Kenneth Pye and former Deans Francis A. Allen and Robert B. McKay
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
58 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The California deans included a number of striking tables in their
brief, based on actual experience at the law school at Berkeley over the
years through 1976 when the brief was prepared. At the outset, they
contended that without "special admissions" programs the conse-
quence would be "the near total exclusion of minority groups and their
continued token representation in the bar" of California.' They
pointed out that in 1970 there were 355,242 lawyers in the United
States of whom only 3,845 were black, or scarcely more than one per-
cent.9 And they added that the number of Chicano, or Mexican-Amer-
ican, lawyers was far smaller both in absolute numbers and in relation
to population percentages. 10 Without special consideration, they con-
tended, "the movement of minority groups toward meaningful repre-
sentation in the profession. . . will virtually cease.""
On what did they base this unhappy prediction? The figures, alas,
are clear. In the past ten years, there has been an enormous increase in
applications to law schools (and to medical schools). As a result, when
conventional tests are used, only persons with very high scores can be
admitted at many schools. There are a large number of applicants who
have scores that indicate they could successfully complete the work of
the law school, but only the top fifth-and at least in some law schools,
the top tenth-can be accepted. Unfortunately, for better or for worse,
very few minority students are in the top group. The fact was that at
Berkeley during the three years 1974, 1975, and 1976, there were 8,042
white applicants of whom 4,126, or 51%, had PGA's (Predicted Grade
Averages, based on a combination of college records and scores on the
Law School Admissions Test) of 75 and above.' 2 On this basis virtu-
ally no blacks or Chicanos would have been admitted. Yet under "af-
firmative action" or "special admissions," 86% of the blacks and
Chicanos who had PGA's of 75 or above were admitted, but only 33%
of the whites, while of those below 75, 26% of the blacks and Chicanos
were admitted, but only 3% of the whites.' 3
signed the brief, and Dean Ernest Gellhorn and Professors David E. Feller and Terrance
Sandalow were of counsel.
8. Brief for Deans of California Schools at 2, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 22.
13. Id. at 25.
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As the California deans said, what termination of special admissions
"implies in terms of the vertical integration of American society, asser-
tion of legal rights on behalf of minority groups, and access to the polit-
ical process requires no elaboration."14 They pointed out that any
effort to deal with the problem in terms of "disadvantaged" students
involves exceedingly difficult problems in defining who is "disadvan-
taged," and would, in any event, require ignoring the basic disadvan-
tage that all our history shows has been most significant in producing
the present situation. Even the expedient of taking all of the applicants
who meet the minimum qualifications and drawing their names from a
hat would produce only a relatively small increase in the number of
minority students, since the number of minority applicants, in terms of
minority percentage of the total population, is smaller than the corre-
sponding percentage of white applicants-and the number of white ap-
plicants could be expected to increase very greatly under such a system
because of the large amount of self-selection that is now present in
white applications to many American law schools.
The brief filed for the AALS fully reinforced the position of the Cali-
fornia law school deans. It showed under one of its headings that:
"The Use of Race as a Factor in the Admissions Process Is Necessary If
There Are To Be a Substantial Number of Minority Students in Law
School." 5 It pointed out that in 1964 there were only 700 black stu-
dents in all the accredited law schools of the country-Il.3% of the total
enrollment of more than 54,265-and 267 of them, or more than a
third, were enrolled in what then were essentially segregated black
schools. 16 With the development of special admissions programs, this
situation changed so that in the fall of 1976 a total of 1700 black and
500 Chicano students were admitted. They represented 4.9% and 1.3%,
respectively, of the total of 43,000 students who were admitted that
year. 17 A careful and thorough study made of 1976 admissions to law
schools by F. Evans on behalf of the Law School Admissions Council
showed that without the special admissions programs, "the nation's two
largest racial minorities, representing nearly 14% of the population,
would have had at most a 2.3% representation in the nation's law
14. Id. at 4.
15. Brief for the Ass'n of Am. Law Schools at 21, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 27-28.
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schools and, more likely, no more than about 1%.' ' 8
How could this result be? It goes back to one of the basic underlying
facts with which we must wrestle in this whole area. Before proceeding
further, I would like to make it plain that we know of no precise meas-
ure of "intelligence"; indeed, we have no very precise or generally ac-
cepted definition of that term. Nor do we have any clear definition of
"success at the bar," or of what makes a "useful and constructive prac-
ticing lawyer." Over the past thirty years we have developed a predic-
tive test of "success in law school," in terms of the law school grades
likely to be achieved by the applicant. This is a combination of the
score on the Law School Admission Test and the applicant's grade
point average based on his college grades. No other method of law
school admission is as effective in predicting success in law school as
this one. Better results are not achieved by personal interviews, by let-
ters of recommendation, by lot, or otherwise. We also know, as a result
of five separate carefully conducted studies, that these measures are not
racially biased, and that they do not underpredict the law school per-
formance of blacks or of Mexican-Americans.' 9
With this background about the tests, we encounter "[t]he ineradica-
ble fact," as put in the AALS brief, "that, as a group, minorities in the
pool of law school applicants achieve dramatically lower LSAT scores
and GPA's than whites."2 In specific terms, 20% of white and uniden-
tified applicants, but only 4% of Chicanos and 1% of blacks receive
both an LSAT score of 600 or above and a GPA of 3.25 or higher.
Similarly, if one sets the combined LSAT/GPA levels at 500 and 2.75
respectively, 60% of the white and unidentified candidates would be
included, but only 23% of the Chicanos and 11% of the blacks.2 1 The
effect of this under a race-blind system inevitably would be to curtail
sharply the number of blacks and Chicanos admitted to law school. If
all applicants were assigned an index number based on the two widely
used predictive tests, "the number of blacks in the top 40,000"-which
was the number admitted to law schools that year-"would have been
370 on one formula and 410 on the other. The equivalent figures for
Chicanos are 225 and 250." 22 And the schools to which these blacks
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id. at 13. Nor are the tests sexually biased. Id.
20. Id. at 28-29.
21. Id. at 29.
22. Id. (footnote omitted).
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and Chicanos would have been admitted are predominantly the least
selective law schools in the country. 3 These are, generally speaking,
schools that lack financial resources, including funds for financial aid
to students.24 Accordingly, a high percentage of minority students
would, for financial reasons, be unable to attend the only schools to
which they could gain admission.
As a result, the AALS brief contended, "the number of black and
Chicano students enrolled in the first-year class in 1976 would have
been approximately 1% of the entering class, roughly the same as in
1964. The progress of a decade would have been wiped out. '25 On a
race-blind basis, "12 of the nation's most selective law schools, which
during 1975 had total minority enrollment of approximately 1,250,
nearly 15% of the national total, would have enrolled 'no more than a
handful of minority students.' "26
Isn't there some other way? Both the California Supreme Court in
Bakke27 and Justice Douglas in his dissent in the DeFunis case28 have
contended that substantial minority enrollments in professional schools
can be maintained without using admission criteria based on race. To
this the AALS brief replied:
If there are means by which that can be done, they are not known to the
law schools. We do know, however, that none of those suggested would
work. None would permit the enrollment of minority students in num-
bers even close to those that now exist and some would, in addition, have
a destructive effect upon the quality of legal education and of the profes-
sion, requiring law schools to admit students-white and black-who are
less qualified to study law than students now being admitted.29
All of these matters, including the inadequacy of any known alterna-
tives, could be discussed in greater detail. If we start with the premise
that we ought to have more black and other minority lawyers and doc-
tors, or that there ought to be greater opportunities for blacks and other
minorities to enter the professions-both because of past discrimina-
tion and because of a current social need in the black and other minor-
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 31-32.
27. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
28. DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312, 340-41 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schools at 32, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).
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ity communities for professional people who share their background
and problems-then we are forced to the conclusion, I think, that we
cannot accomplish this result by proceeding on a race-blind basis.30
Consequently, largely for the reasons so well advanced in the AALS
brief, I support the Bakke judgment in reversing the California
Supreme Court's conclusion that admission to public professional
schools must be on a race-blind basis.
III.
At the same time, I do not like quotas in admissions, and at least I
understand the reasons why there are serious concerns about quotas.
No matter how you look at it, the admission system at the medical
school of the University of California at Davis was a quota system.
There were sixteen places out of one hundred that were reserved for
minority students; and the system was clearly a two-track system, with
the minority applicants being considered on a different basis by a sepa-
rate group of admissions officers, and without any comparison on any
basis with the nonminority applicants whose admission followed the
regular track. Consequently, I am persuaded by Justice Powell, and the
four other members of the Court who were with him on this issue, that
the admissions system actually before the Court in the Bakke case was
bad and that Bakke had been illegally discriminated against because of
the purely numerical system, which, by preventing his being compared
in any way with the minority applicants, resulted in his being denied
admission to the medical school.31
What is the difference between a quota, such as that involved in the
Davis admissions plan, and an overall consideration of all of the appli-
cants taking into account "all relevant factors," such as was apparently
approved by the judgment in the Bakke case? Not much.32 It is clearly
30. On this I concur with Mr. Justice Blackmun's statement in his opinion in the Bakke case;
"In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race." 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
31. See id.
32. Professor Louis Lusky, who disapproves of the Bakke result, trenchantly observes: "It is
less than twenty years since covert anti-black discrimination through similar administrative abra-
cadabra formed an effective barrier to implementation of Brown v. Board ofEducation-almost to
the point of nullification." Lusky, Government by Judiciary: What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS
CON. L.Q. -, - (1979). And he adds, with respect to the construction of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), that "in 1964 the consequence of covert anti-black discrimination
through sophisticated administrative 'plans' were too painfully evident to be overlooked or used as
a model for civil rights legislation." Id. at -.
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a difference of degree, and "none the worse for it," as Holmes observed
many years ago. 3 It is a question of approach or emphasis. I do not
think that it can be mathematically or logically demonstrated that one
way is bad and the other is good, particularly when it is clear that many
of the factors that are relevant in any admissions system are not quanti-
fiable and cannot be put on any sort of a scale to be weighed one
against the other in any conclusive fashion. It should be remembered,
too, that in many-if not most-professional schools, after you select
the top applicants who are clearly admissible on any basis, there is next
a large group of applicants whose numerical predictors-test scores and
GPA's-are not much different from each other, often not different
enough to have any statistical significance. It is at this point that other
factors can play a wholly legitimate role to affect the mix in the class,
to give recognition and weight to factors of background, experience,
interest, and maturity, all of which may contribute to the educational
process of the group and point to the possibility that a particular
applicant may have potential for greater service to the community than
another who lacks his personal background or qualities. These factors
may well be relevant over a considerable spread in the numerical
predictors, as long as all persons selected are of a calibre so that the
predictors show that they have a high probability of successfully com-
pleting the work of the professional school. But there remains a serious
risk.34
IV.
Thus, on all of its conclusions, I support the opinion of Justice Pow-
ell, and the judgment of the Court. You will note that in reaching this
point, I have cited no cases or other legal authorities. I have not even
quoted the equal protection clause,35 or any other part of the Constitu-
33. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631 (1906) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Cf Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1977, at 14, col. 4 (observations of former Under Secretary of
Labor Lawrence H. Silberman). He concluded, with respect to affirmative action in the labor
field, "I now realize that the distinction we saw between goals and timetables on the one hand and
unconstitutional quotas on the other, was not valid." Id.
35. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I:
All persons born or naturalized m the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State where they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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tion, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36 This is because, as I
said at the beginning, I think of the question as primarily a philosophi-
cal and social question, and hardly a legal question at all.37 Indeed, I
do not think that there is anything in the Constitution that really says
very much of anything about it. Yes, I know there is the equal protec-
tion clause, but that never has been regarded as requiring mathematical
equality, or as preventing differential actions from being taken on
grounds that at the time are considered as rational.
If the question presented by Bakke is not a legal question, what was
it doing in court? As de Tocqueville observed a century and a half ago,
we have a tendency, sometimes unfortunate, to throw all questions into
court.38 The mere fact that an issue presents essentially a social and
philosophical question, not really covered by anything in the Constitu-
tion, has never kept our courts from considering it. Hours of labor,39
minimum wage,4" child labor,41 and abortion 42 may be cited as
examples.
If a more substantial support for my conclusion is thought to be
needed, it can be found, I believe, in the long and troubled history in
this part of North America-from the first landing of blacks in Virginia
in 16 1913 through the slave codes, on the one hand, and the abolition-
ists, on the other. We did have a great civil war, which, though ostensi-
bly fought to "save the Union," would never have occurred if the
country had not been torn by the social, economic, and moral questions
36. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
37. Cf. Kimball, An Historical Perspective on the Constitutional Debate over Affirmative Action
Admissions, 7 J.L. & EDuc. 31,48 (1978) ("the 'special admissions programs' are one more expres-
sion of the social service commitment of the university and professional schools").
38. "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States which is not resolved, sooner
or later, into a judicial question." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRACY IN AMERICA 357 (2d ed.
Cambridge 1863) (1856).
39. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
40. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Sturges & Burn v. Beauchamp, 231
U.S. 320 (1913).
42. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. See A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 20 (1978).
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of slavery. The war was resolved on the battlefield, and this resolution
was put into our fundamental law by the thirteenth,44 fourteenth,45 and
fifteenth amendments.4 6 Then came a century of relative quiescence,
while we waited too long to make the amendments effective, and took
steps to perpetuate the social and economic deficiencies with the excuse
that we had resolved the moral question. The way out of this period of
stagnation has been led by the Supreme Court, relying heavily on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, aided by some
delayed, but important, federal legislation.
Of course, a legal basis must exist for any court decision. In this
instance, it seems to me that it can be readily found in the fourteenth
amendment in the light of its history and the total history of our coun-
try. Though the problem is and remains a social, economic, and moral
problem, we have deliberately constructed our fundamental law so as
to make it possible for courts to deal with it. This is surely true, it
seems to me, as far as blacks are concerned. Perhaps the same reason-
ing can be applied to Indians, or Native Americans. The history with
respect to other groups, such as Chicanos (Spanish Americans or Pu-
erto Ricans), may well be different. They, or their ancestors, were not
brought here against their will or held as slaves. But some of the same
factors may be relevant there, enough so that it is not easy to draw an
adequate line between them and others whom the fourteenth amend-
ment was clearly intended to protect.
In his dissent in the DeFunis case, Justice Douglas spoke eloquently
when he said:
The purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce Black
lawyers for Blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews,
Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for Ameri-
cans, and not to place First Amendment barriers against anyone.4 7
This is surely an ideal towards which we should aspire and towards
which we must move. As far as many segments of the public are con-
cerned, we have made great strides in that direction, not through ho-
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
45, See note 35 supra.
46. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."
47. 416 U.S. at 342 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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mogenizing all the people in the great American melting pot, as some
sought to do in the early part of this century, but by greater under-
standing and greater common acceptance of persons of widely different
ethnic background-as long as they came from Europe, and not Asia
or Africa. But we still have a long way to go with respect to other
elements of our population. The success we have achieved in some
areas leaves room for hope that we can bring about improvements with
respect to the more difficult problems. But we cannot do so unless we
provide real practical equality of opportunity to qualified members of
the racially disadvantaged groups. This is what the Bakke case and the
fourteenth amendment are all about.
V.
Having come out in support of the Bakke judgment, basically on
social and moral grounds, but with, I believe, an adequate legal foun-
dation, I will now say that it leaves me with a feeling of profound
unease. I have a disturbing doubt whether I am a do-gooder who un-
dertakes to intervene in the lives of other people because it gives me
satisfaction to feel that I am disposing of some of the world's largess in
a way that I think will be useful.48 Some say that taking such action is
simply a means of assuaging our own guilt feelings. I do not think that
is a correct analysis. As far as I can tell, I do not have a fundamental
guilt feeling in this area, though I surely have had some failings. Talk
about guilt feelings in terms of the wrongs done in the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries seems to me to be nothing but a
massive charge of guilt by long-range and highly attenuated associa-
tion. By our present standards, there were grave abuses in those days;
but no one now living owned a slave, or engaged in the slave trade, or
acted on the basis that the Negro "had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect."49 The problem is with us, and we-all of
48. See W. GAYLINE, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS & D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS
OF BENEVOLENCE (1977), reviewedin Orwin, Neo-Liberalism, 53 PuB. INTEREST 124 (1978). It is
hard to be sure that the attempt to do good really results in accomplishing something that is really
good. See B. GRoss, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE (1978). Affirmative action may in fact benefit
"more privileged blacks, with the unintentional effect of contributing to growing economic-class
differences within the black community." Williams, Race and Economics, 53 Pun. INTEREST 147
(1978). A federal study shows that "in certain income categories, a higher proportion of black
college-age youth attend college than do their white counterparts." 53 PUB. INTEREST 119-20
(1978).
49. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). It has been correctly noted that
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us-surely have responsibilities. I think that we should do what we can
to meet those responsibilities, not because of any guilt feelings, but be-
cause the problem is a social problem, and we are all members of
society.
There is a related aspect to the problem, though, that gives me con-
siderable concern. It is good to do good, but who bears the burden?
When I was dean of a law school, we had serious admission problems,
because there were far more applicants than we could accept. One of
the functions of the dean is to receive pressure in such cases, and to
resist it as wisely and courteously as he can. Some of the pressure came
from good alumni of the school who had sons or daughters whom they
wanted to have admitted. These situations could be very appealing.
Most of the alumni were reasonably understanding about it, but all
were hurt when an adverse decision was made. I found that the way
that I could hold the line and keep myself from too much distress was
by recognizing that when you have a limited number of places, the ad-
mission of any one person means that some other well-qualified person
will be excluded. It was hard to tell the alumnus that we could not take
his son. It would have been harder to tell the next man on the list,
better qualified by hypothesis than the son of the alumnus, that we
could not take him because we were taking the alumnus' son.
In the Bakke case, that man is Bakke. But for the unfortunate way
in which the admissions program at Davis was set up--with a quota
and a separate admissions track-Bakke would have been denied ad-
mission in order to admit a minority applicant. And in the future
under the Bakke decision, various well-qualified applicants will be ex-
cluded because other applicants have qualities, such as blackness or a
Spanish surname, that are thought by admissions committees to make
them more eligible for acceptance. It is impossible to say that Bakke
was himself guilty of any injustice to other applicants. It is equally
hard to say that others who will be excluded in the future under the
rule approved by the judgment in the Bakke case have been guilty of
any injustice to those who are accepted. It is only by seeing that we are
dealing with a social and moral problem, made particularly intense by
our long history of discrimination, that I can bring myself to accept
what would have been the injustice to Bakke if he had not been eventu-
Chief Justice Taney spoke of the American situation prior to and including 1776. A.L. HIGGIN-
HOTHAM, supra note 43, at 6.
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ally admitted, and what has been, or will be, the injustice to other ap-
plicants who have been excluded from many schools that have
followed more skillfully prepared plans of selective admission than the
one used at Davis. Professor William Van Alstyne puts this question
strikingly:
In brief, the Davis plan as an engine for amortizing the national racial
debt is a zero sum game which arbitrarily disadvantages a few whites very
greatly indeed and no one else at all; a system of transfer payments en-
forced at the gates of a state university medical school. . . . The system
of racial transfer payments is perfectly calculated to dissipate its entire
impact on otherwise "marginal" white applicants, i e., those from circum-
stances least profiting from the antecedent racism in America and among
the least able to pay that debt.5°
Apart from this individual burden, it should be observed, too, that
there is an inherent element of invidiousness in any affirmative action
program, no matter how carefully it is prepared or sincerely advanced.
For the time being this can be justified, but it does warrant a note of
caution. Racism will not wholly cease until the time comes when we
can ignore race while we allocate scarce resources.
VI.
My unease also derives from another ground, which adds to my con-
cern. Our society is moving in one way or another towards an egalitari-
anism that is more rigid than we have thought wise in the past, and this
may be particularly true in the field of education. In the past the com-
monly accepted standard has been "equality of opportunity," with the
expectation that "excellence" is the ultimate objective and that our so-
ciety will be so arranged that it will, in normal course, provide encour-
agement for superior achievement." Along with this is a large element
of noblesse oblige under which the more successful are given opportuni-
ties in various ways to aid the less successful, and are expected to use
those opportunities at least to a reasonable extent. It has long been our
experience and expectation that a relatively few members of the society
will provide most of the innovation, most of the ideas, most of the initi-
ative, and most of the motive power and leadership necessary to the
50. Van Alstyne, A Preliminary Report on the Bakke Case, 64 A.A.U.P. BULL. 286 (Dec.
1978).
51. This is pejoratively called "the intellectual meritocracy" in Kimball, supra note 37, at 44,
perhaps indicating a bias that is currently active among professional educators.
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sound development of our social and economic systems, and that per-
sons who have these qualities should be encouraged.
In recent years, though, education and many other aspects of society
have been moving or drifting towards that sort of absolute equality that
we call egalitarianism. In elementary schools children do what they
want instead of what will draw them out and lead them to an aware-
ness that they have greater capabilities than they realize. In colleges
and universities we have pass-fail and the absence of requirements, and
there are many other trends of this sort.
The problems in this area have been thoroughly explored by Arthur
M. Okun in his book on Equality and Efficiency. The Big Trade Off,2
and in his subsequent article on Further Thoughts on Equality and Effi-
ciency. 3 Mr. Okun's survey shows, as I think we have all come to see
in recent years, that greater equality leads almost inevitably to lower
efficiency or decreased excellence.
How far is this involved in the Bakke problem? There is no way to
be sure, but I find that I cannot escape the feeling that it is involved,
and probably to a significant extent. Under the judgment in the Bakke
case, which, as I have said, I favor and accept, I feel that there will be
some reduction of average standards, perhaps an appreciable reduc-
tion. This is a price we have to pay, but I think that it is of some impor-
tance that we recognize that we are paying that price, and that over the
years we do what we can to restore the highest standards in education
that we can maintain. Hopefully, as more minorities enter the main-
stream of American professional life through the doorway of the Bakke
case, they will successfully meet new challenges, and devise new roads
for innovation and new means of leadership. In the long run, the pro-
vision of greater "equality of opportunity" through the Bakke decision
need not result in the deadening absolute of egalitarianism. But there
is a risk; and we must watch.
VII.
The Bakke problem has been discussed principally in terms of ad-
missions because that is the field in which it and its forerunner, the
DeFunis case, arose. There are, however, other situations presenting
52. A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE OFF (1975).
53. Okun, Further Thoughts on Equalio , and Effcienc, in INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 13 (D.
Campbell ed. 1977).
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aspects of the question of the extent to Which race may be a factor in
allocating scarce resources.
Probably the closest problem is that of finandial aid to education;
that is, the granting of preferences in the award of scholarships and
other financial aid. Experience shows that most persons admitted
under a special admissions program are not able to avail themselves of
the opportunity if they have to rely on their own financing. Accepting
the Bakke judgment, the question then arises how far may race be
taken into account in allocating financial aid, which, at virtually every
institution, is a scarce resource. Here, as with respect to admission it-
self, we must recall that every dollar of financial aid made available to
one student means that there will be that much less available for one or
more others.
This problem was presented in the case of Flanagan v. President and
Directors of Georgetown College.4 Plaintiff was a white student, who
successfully contended that he had been discriminated against in viola-
tion of sections 601 and 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 19 64 1S when
Georgetown established an affirmative action program of financial aid.
Under this program sixty percent of available financial aid was allo-
cated to minority students. The term "minority" was defined rather
broadly to include persons with educational, social, and cultural disad-
vantages, and could be applied to white students. 5 6 The result was,
though, that in plaintiffs case, he was awarded $400 while many black
applicants in similar financial circumstances were awarded $2500 in
financial aid.5 7 As indicated, the court held that this program was dis-
criminatory and contrary to the statute.5 8 Following this decision
about liability, Georgetown settled the case with plaintiff, so no appel-
late decision became available. It should be noted, too, that this was
before the Bakke decision in which only four members of the Supreme
Court felt that the Civil Rights Act was applicable.
There are, or have been, a number of federally funded grants specifi-
cally designated for minority or disadvantaged persons. These include
the funds made available to the Council on Legal Education Opportu-
nity and the Graduate and Professional Opportunities Fellowships.
54. 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-I (1976).
56. 417 F. Supp. at 379.
57. Id. at 381.
58. Id. at 385.
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Since these were provided by Congress, it seems clear that they do not
violate Title VI.59 No one, as far as I know, has suggested that they are
Subject to any constitutional infirmity.
Apart from admissions itself and financial aid, expenditures have
sometimes been made by educational institutions on what might be
called a differential (or, indeed, discriminatory) basis. For example,
special programs have been developed by public institutions and by
private institutions that in one way or another receive public support,
which are designed to recruit minority students. Indeed, the Supreme
Court of California in its Bakke decision6" suggested such special ef-
forts at recruitment as one of the means that might be followed by a
state educational institution. It can hardly be contended that such pro-
grams and expenditures have always been race color-blind. Desirable
as they may be, it seems likely that they should be carefully scrutinized,
and care should be taken to ensure that they are broad enough to cover
a fairly wide spectrum of disadvantaged students. The same may be
said with respect to special programs such as tutoring and counselling,
which an institution may make available to its students. Confining
these to a fairly narrow group may have a stigmatizing effect. Though
the matter is analytically close to the Bakke problem, it can be readily
avoided by the exercise of reasonable care in seeing that these services
are made available to all students who have need of them.6'
Another case in the field of education gets us into sex discrimination
and employment. As employment is the subject of another program in
this series, I shall make only brief reference to it. This is the case of
Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth University.62 A stipulation filed in
the district court showed that plaintiff was a white faculty member. He
received a temporary appointment in the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology. During the year of his appointment, he applied for pro-
motion to either one of two regular positions. A total of 385 applica-
tions were received by the University for these two positions, of which
57 were from female applicants and 328 were received from males. In
the selection process, the files of the applicants deemed qualified were
59. See note 36 supra.
60. Bakke v. Regents of the Umv. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680
1976).
61. THE BAKKE DECISION: IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ADMISSIONS, AMERI-
AN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, AND ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS (W. McCormack
cd. 1978).
62. 415 F. Supp 673 (E.D. Va. 1976), af'dpr curm, 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1978).
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first pulled out. Then, these files were divided into three groups: fe-
males, minority males, and white males. Only applications in the fe-
male pile received further consideration; only they were interviewed for
the two vacant positions; and two females were eventually appointed.
In taking this action the department appointment committee was
clearly influenced by the "goals and timetables" provision of Executive
Order 11246,63 as made applicable to sex in 1967,64 and by the corre-
sponding Executive Order No. 29 issued by the Governor of Virginia. 65
Acting under the Virginia executive order, the Board of Visitors of the
University had promulgated "The Affirmative Action Program of Vir-
ginia Commonwealth University" on November 15, 1973.
The court held that plaintiff had been wrongfully discriminated
against in violation of the United States Constitution and the provi-
sions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.66 It should be noted, of
course, that this was prior to the Bakke decision. After the decision,
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, on behalf of the
Secretary of Labor, filed a motion to intervene in the case.67 This is the
fifth brief filed by the Department in affirmative action cases, but the
first one involving sex discrimination. Just how the problem stands in
the light of the judgment in the Bakke case remains to be seen.
Before proceeding to the next problem, I would like to make brief
reference to another employment case-which may well become the
next cause cl'bre. This is Weber v. Kaiser 4luminum and Chemical
Co.,68 decided late in 1977 by a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. There, without any showing of prior discrimination,69 a col-
lectively bargained labor agreement provided that an on-the-job train-
ing program should admit minority workers on a one-for-one basis.70
The court held that this was a quota system, which violated the Civil
63. 30 Fed. Reg. 1231 (1965).
64. Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967).
65. 415 F. Supp. at 675.
66. Id. at 682.
67. Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1978, § 1, at 7, col. 4. Thereafter, the court of appeals filed a new
opinion, remanding the case to the district court to find the facts, saying that if Cramer was given
consideration, then "the legal question may not be present." 586 F.2d at 300. The opinion of the
court of appeals shows that the stipulation before the district court may not have been accurate,
and that, in fact, Cramer was considered "for each of the three positions," but "he was not rated
highly among the candidates for either." Id. at 299.
68. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 720 (1978) (No. 78-435).
69. Id. at 224.
70. Id. at 222.
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Rights Act, 7I and that, to the extent that the program was carried out in
an effort to comply with the "goals and timetables" provision of Execu-
tive Order No. 11246,72 the executive order would have to yield to the
congressional prohibition against such discrimination.73 Judge Wis-
dom filed a long and careful dissent-all, of course, prior to the Bakke
decision. 74 How this problem will eventually be resolved remains to be
seen.
75
The next problem in this area relates to the ten percent set-aside for
minority business, which is provided by the Public Works Compensa-
tion Act. 76 This, of course, provides a quota and eliminates any neces-
sity for showing prior discrimination by any of the contractors
involved. In Rhode Island Chapter ofAssociated General Contractors v.
Kreps77 Judge Pettine wrote a long and careful opinion upholding this
provision of the statute. The opinion is an important one because it
stresses that different considerations may apply in different areas, and
that a "quota" in a business area may be upheld when it would not be
sustained in the field of education. He said:
Quotas in educational institutions are much more disruptive than goals
because they seem to require the substitution of whatever notions of merit
prevail at a particular institution with a non-meritorious, indeed suspect,
criterion. We need not address that issue here for this case does not in-
volve the disruption of an institution. Nor does it involve divesting those
with reasonable expectations for the benefit of others. In the market-
place, no such expectations become firm and there is no accrued right to a
government contract, especially to funds only recently made available on
an emergency basis. No on-going private institutional arrangements are
being disrupted by the use of this quota. The market, not a private insti-
tution, is the locus of this remedy.
78
This suggestion is interesting, but not wholly persuasive. There is no
"right" to welfare, but if it is made available, we know that it cannot be
71. Id. at 227.
72. 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965).
73. 563 F.2d at 227.
74. Id.
75. Petitions for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court, including one by the Solicitor General
on behalf of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have been granted, and the case
was argued on March 28, 1979. No. 78-435, 1978 Term.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-28, § 103, 91 Stat. 116
(1977).
77. 450 F. Supp. 338 (D.R.I. 1978).
78. Id. at 352 n.7.
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provided on a discriminatory basis.79 Suppose, for example, the statute
before Judge Pettine had provided that no contracts would be awarded
to blacks. We know that such a statute would be invalid, and it would
not be saved on the ground that "[i]n the market-place, no such expec-
tations become firm and there is no accrued right to a government
contract."80
With respect to another and important aspect of the problem, Judge
Pettine pointed out that whatever may be the powers of state and pri-
vate parties (as in the Bakke and the Weber cases), "to implement af-
"firmative action remedies without specific findings of discrimination, it
is beyond doubt that Congress has that power.""'
This may well be, in the long run, the key to the problems in this
area. As I suggested early in this article, the problems do not seem to
me to be really legal in anything but a rather narrow and technical
sense. Rather, they are social, philosophical, and moral problems of
our society, which, insofar as they can be resolved by governmental
action-and I think governmental action is important-may well be
better resolved by legislative action than by the courts. Congress has
the power--certainly as to blacks-under section five of the fourteenth
amendment,8" and it may well be that the congressional power, and
also the power of Congress under the commerce clause,83 extends to
other racial minorities as well.
VIII.
Let me now turn to another area in which there has been a consider-
able though still rudimentary development that can be fairly denomi-
nated as a judicially created affirmative action in the allocation of
scarce resources. This is the question of the granting of radio and tele-
vision licenses to competing applicants, and the extent to which race,
other minority status, or sex can or must be taken into account by the
Federal Communications Commission. There is no federal statute that
mandates or expressly allows "affirmative action" in this area. Must
79. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483 (1970).
80. 450 F. Supp. at 352 n.7.
81. Id. at 354 n.14. See also Glazer, Why Bakke Won't EndRey'erse Discrimination. 2 Cosi-
MENTARY 36 (Sept. 1978).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article."
83. U.S. CoNsT'. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Com-
merce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
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the Commission take these factors into account-and how-in going
about the delicate task of allocating the nation's scarce radio and televi-
sion frequencies?
This question apparently first arose in the opinion of Judge Fahy of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the case of
TV-9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.84 That case in-
volved competing applications for a construction permit to operate a
commercial television station in Orlando, Florida. One of the appli-
cants relied on the fact that two of its owners were local black residents.
One of them had a 7.17% voting interest, and the other was a local
doctor with a 7% voting interest. Both lived in the local area where
about 25% of the people were black. Both were directors of the corpo-
ration. One of them was to assume the office of vice president and to
devote two days a week to the station.85
The Commission, through its various layers of review, gave no
weight or effect to this black ownership. 6 The Review Board said that
black ownership cannot and should not be an independent comparative
factor. 7
The court of appeals reversed this conclusion.88 It said: "To say that
the Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind, does not
fully describe the breadth of the public interest criterion embodied in
the Act."89 On this basis the court concluded that "credit" should be
given for the participation of the two black shareholders, and that
"merit should be awarded" on their account.90 In support of these con-
clusions, it said:
It is consistent with the primary objective of maximum diversification of
ownership of mass communications media for the Commission in a com-
parative license proceeding to afford favorable consideration to an appli-
cant who, not as a mere token, but in good faith as broadening
community representation, gives a local minority group media
entrepreneurship. 91
84. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). See also Citizens Com-
munications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213-14 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. 495 F.2d at 935.
86. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 34, 268 (1970).
87. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17-18 (1972).
X8. 495 F.2d at 936.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 937-38.
91. Id. at 937.
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A petition for rehearing en banc was filed.92 This was denied, 93 but
the court wrote a further opinion in which it qualified its statement
somewhat. In answer to the contention that its opinion called for a
"new comparative policy of awarding preferences for Black or minority
ownership, per se," the court wrote that "our opinion makes no men-
tion of a preference in this matter." 94 It added95 that "the court deter-
mines only that Comint was entitled to be accorded merit due to the
ownership and participation of Dr. Smith and Mr. Perkins. ' 96 And it
concluded:
However, in view of the nature of the issues in this case, and the
probability that Black persons having substantial identification with mi-
nority rights will be able to translate their positions, though not techni-
cally "managerial," and their ownership stake, into meaningful effect on
this aspect of station programming, we think that such material factors
residing in the evidence cannot reasonably be totally and rigidly excluded
from favorable consideration. 97
A petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court, seeking review
of this decision, particularly in the ight of the then pending DeFunis
case. The Solicitor General joined in this petition, but it was denied. 9
So the case went back to the Federal Communications Commission,
where it now remains, believe it or not, in its twenty-fifth year. In the
further proceedings before the Commission, a new element appeared.
One of the competing claimants relied on the fact that thirty-three per-
cent of its stock was owned by a woman who planned to spend full-
time in the operation of the station. It advanced the contention that a
far higher proportion of the audience in Orlando was made up of wo-
92. Id. at 941.
93. Id. at 942.
94. Id. at 941.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 942.
97. A subsequent decision of the court of appeals is Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Garrett involved the application of a radio station seeking authority to construct facilities
that would enable it to change from daytime-only to unlimited-time broadcasting. The Commis-
sion refused this authority. The court of appeals reversed, relying largely on the fact that the
applicant is "solely owned by appellant, Leroy Garrett, who is black." Id. at 1061. The court
pointed out that the administrative law judge did not even allude to this factor in his initial deci-
sion, and the Review Board designated it as "without decisional significance." Id. (quoting Leroy
Garrett, 38 F.C.C.2d 112, 116 (1972)). The court of appeals referred to its TV-9 decision, and
said: "It is evident that the Review Board's treatment of WEUP's blackness cannot be harmo-
nized with the principles articulated in TV9." Id. at 1063.
98. 55 F.C.C.2d 112 (1975).
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men than of blacks, and that it was entitled to a "merit" more than
sufficient to outweigh the "merit" due to Comint because of its smaller
element of black ownership and participation in the operation of the
station. There are other issues in the case, and it is not at all clear what
weight eventually will be given to black ownership, or ownership by
women, either on an absolute or a comparative basis. It is clear,
though, that once minority status of one sort is found to be relevant, the
situation can become rather complicated.
This can be illustrated by another decision of the Review Board of
the Commission in Gainesville Media, Inc.99 The case arose out of
three mutually exclusive applications for authority to construct a new
FM broadcast station in Gainesville, Florida. I will not go into the
details. Reference to the case is simply intended to illustrate the se-
mantic problems that arise in connection with considerations of this
sort. On several occasions the Review Board said that a "credit" or "an
important credit" should go to one of the applicants because one of the
owners, with a ten percent interest, was black. In other places the Re-
view Board said that "merit" should be awarded for minority owner-
ship, but added that "merit" meant only favorable consideration or a
plus factor, not a "preference."" In still other places the Review
Board said that "minority stock ownership. . . is a consideration rele-
vant to a choice among applicants"'' and that "favorable considera-
tion" should be given "to an applicant who. . . in good faith. . . gives
a local minority group media entrepreneurship."'0 2 Just what is the
relevant weight to be given to "credit," "merit," "preference," "relevant
consideration," or "favorable consideration" is not clear. Perhaps it
can be said that problems of this sort-that is, of the weight to be given
to many diverse factors-are often encountered in comparative deci-
sions before the Federal Communications Commission.
There has been a further development in this area that may prove to
be of considerable importance. On January 31, 1978, the Office of
Telecommunications Policy in the Executive Office of the President
and the Department of Commerce jointly filed a formal petition with
the Federal Communications Commission, 103 seeking to have the Com-
99. Gainesville Media, Inc., 43 Rad. Rep. 2d 604, 610 (Review Board 1978).
100. TV-9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 941 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
101. Id. at 937.
102. Id.
103. Statement by Sec'y of Commerce Juanita M. Kreps on the Petitioning of the FCC to
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mission adopt a rule that would "establish a policy of promoting own-
ership of broadcast facilities by minorities especially in those areas
where minorities constitute a significant percentage of the population
and have little or no present ownership."'" For this purpose, the peti-
tion filed with the Commission defines "minorities" as including "per-
sons of Black, Hispanic surnamed, American Indian, Native American
and Asiatic-American extraction."' 0 5 The petition also asserts that
"[w]omen, of course, are also included to the extent that they are also
within one of the stated minorities."'1 6 Thus, women as a class are not
covered, unless they are minority women. The petition adds: "We
would not propose to include women generally because of the potential
for defeating the objective of the proposed policy through family stock
ownership arrangements."'0 7
Upon its filing, the White House Press Secretary issued a news re-
lease summarizing the petition and announcing that "[t]o ease initial
financing problems, the [Small Business Administration] and the [Eco-
nomic Development Administration] have announced rule changes to
extend their loan and loan guarantee problems to broadcast and cable
facilities."' 08 In addition, "[b]oth agencies intend minorities to be the
major beneficiaries of their rule changes."109 At the same time, the De-
partment of Commerce issued a news release saying that they had
joined in petitioning "the FCC to establish a policy of promoting mi-
nority ownership of U.S. broadcast facilities.' 'I
The Commission has taken several actions in this area. It established
a Minority Ownership Task Force, which held a conference in April
1977. That Task Force put out a report on May 17, 1978, which the
establish a policy of promoting minority ownership of U.S. broadcast facilities, News Release,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Jan. 31, 1978).
104. In re Petition for Establishment of Policy to Promote Broadcast Ownership by Minori-
ties, and Related Implementing Policies, F.C.C. 1 (filed Jan. 31, 1978) (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at n.l.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 14-No.5 TELECOMMUNICATIONS MINORITY ASSISTING PROGRAM, WEEKLY COM. OF
PRES. Doc. 252, 253 (1978).
109. Id. at 254.
110. Statement by See'y of Commerce Juanita M. Kreps on the petitioning of the FCC to
establish a policy of promoting minority ownership of U.S. broadcast facilities, News Release,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Jan. 31, 1978).
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Commission published."' On May 25, 1978, the Commission issued a
Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facili-
ties," 2 which deals primarily with steps to be taken to facilitate the
transfer of interests in radio and television stations to black purchas-
ers." 3 And on November 1, 1978, the Commission announced that it
would soon be issuing a response to the petition filed by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, formerly the
Office of Telecommunications Policy, and the Department of
Commerce.
There are almost no limits to the areas in which similar problems
and approaches may be used. Any field that is subject to government
regulation or inducement may become an occasion for "affirmative ac-
tion." Consider, for example, the Judicial Selection Commissions,
which have been established in the past year-and-a-half 1 4 and which
have an especially important role to fill under recently enacted legisla-
tion establishing many new federal judgeships." 5 Recently, I heard
about a special problem of the allocation of scarce facilities; namely,
that of landing slots at our most crowded airports such as LaGuardia
Airport, National Airport, O'Hare Field, and Los Angeles Interna-
tional. These, I am told, are now allocated by agreement among the
affected airlines. Will priorities have to be given for minority airlines?
Indeed, how will we establish minority airlines in a time of
deregulation?
CONCLUSION
Apart from the labor field, which is the subject of another lecture in
this series, I have tried to give a summary of the possible impact of the
Bakke decision on various aspects of education and other fields. In the
111. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, Mi-
NORITY OWNERSHIP REPORT (1978).
112. 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978). The statement concludes with a footnote, id. at 984 n.22, which
reads: "while today's actions are limited to minority ownership because of the weight of the evi-
dence on this issue, other clearly definable groups, such as women, may be able to demonstrate
that they are eligible for similar treatment."
113. Id. at 982-83. On November 2, 1978, the Commission announced that it "will maintain a
list of minority persons who are interested in purchasing broadcast facilities." Public Notice 78-
772, 43 Fed. Reg. 52054 (1978).
114. Exec. Order No. 11972, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1978), amended by Exec. Order No. 11993, 3 C.F.R.
126 (1978), revoked and replaced by Exec. Order No. 12059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20949 (1978).
115. Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 44,44 note, 133 &
133 note).
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process I have endeavored to suggest my evaluation of the Bakke deci-
sion itself. If this seems rather inconclusive, that does not surprise me,
for we are dealing with a movement, with a development in our na-
tional history, with something that transcends the law and lawyers'
lucubrations.
Where is the line between "affirmative action" and "quotas"? How
far will the implications of the Bakke case spread? Indeed, in view of
the ad hoc nature of the ultimate "majorities" in the Bakke decision,
how long will that case last? These questions I cannot answer, and I
am not much concerned that that is so.
There are some questions with which the Supreme Court deals that
are not resolvable in ultimate detail and, I venture to say, fortunately
so. In the Pentagon Papers"6 case the Court held that there could be
no prior restraint on the publication of the particular papers then
before it; but a clear majority of the Court refused to say that there
could never be prior restraint on publication in the name of national
security. Where is the line between freedom of the press and fair trial?
We know a number of things about that line, but no one can say pre-
cisely where it is. Even everyday questions, like negligence and fraud
and the line between tax evasion and tax avoidance, have never been
finally delineated and, I would suppose, never will be.
As I said at the beginning of this paper, the Bakke problem is, in my
view, more a social and philosophical and moral question than it is a
legal question with which lawyers are peculiarly fitted to deal. This
does not deny that there are legal elements in it; nor does it suggest by
any means that there is no appropriate role for the courts, especially in
the application of any determinations that the legislature, as the au-
thorized spokesman for society, may make. For affirmative action, jus-
tice in society, justice for all, is fundamentally a social and political
problem. The Bakke decision has performed an important function in
bringing this sharply to public attention. Let us get on with the job,
being careful in the process to weigh into the scales the new problems
that affirmative action itself inevitably creates.
116. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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